As promised, here are my responses to the five anti-war questions in The Truth Laid Bear's Cross-Blog Iraq Debate
1. Attacking Iraq has been publicly called a "pre-emption" of a threat from Saddam Hussein's regime, whose sins include launching regional wars of aggression. Do you think there is a clear and reliable difference between pre-emptive and aggressive warfare, and if so, what is it?
The difference is one of intent: is the goal conquest and possession of territories, or the imposition of benign political change, followed by withdrawal? Intent is in general difficult to prove; it may be impossible to prove altogether, other than in hindsight.
All that can be done is to look to past precedents for guidance. Based on this, Iraqi actions against Iran and Kuwait were unquestionably cts of aggression, since the goal was to seize and permanently hold enemy territory for material gain.
By contrast, it has been over a century since the United States waged a war of conquest. The last significant permanent acquisition of territory through warfare was the Spanish-American War; and of all the possessions gained then, only Puerto Rico and Guam remain under US control (and Puerto Rico has been offered both statehood and independence, and has turned down both). Territory captured in World War I, World War II, the Cold War, Panama, Grenada, Kuwait, and the former Yugoslavia is now all under the control of the local populations. In the case of Kuwait, there was not even an effort to establish a new regime; the old government was restored, more or less intact (for better or worse).
If the United States were to try to turn Iraq into a colonial possession, it would be a reversal of a century of precedent; and given the notorious isolationism of the American people, and the perpetual popularity of calls to "bring our boys home", such a move would not be popular with the American public. It is far more likely that we will withdraw too soon, rather than linger too long.
2. What do you feel are the prospects that an invasion of Iraq will succeed in a) maintaining it as a stable entity and b) in turning it into a democracy? Are there any precedents in the past 50 years that influence your answer?
Precedents within the time window specified are few, largely because that period was taken up by the Cold War. During that conflict, American foreign policy was focused (rightly or wrongly) on containing the Soviet Union and maintaining the stability of our strategic allies, rather than on human rights and democratic reforms. Nonetheless, there has been promising liberalization and democratization the former Eastern Bloc countries, and the European nations that were once Soviet "republics" (with the exception of Belarus). Also, South Korea and Taiwan, both within the American sphere of influence, have become more open and democratic during this period. Finally, South America, which was dominated by military dictatorships and totalitarian socialist regimes through the 1970s, is now almost wholly democratic; Mark Steyn has argued that this process began when the Galtieri regime in Argentina was discredited and overthrown in the aftermath of the Falkland Islands War. The fact that these changes took place without American occupation (and in some cases with no American military presence at all) should bode well for the potential for reform in any country liberated from an oppressive regime.
Further, I object to the 50-year time limit imposed in this question; it seems calculated to exclude the most obvious and successful precedents, post-war Germany and Japan. The intent may be to limit comparisons to more comparable eras, implicitly assuming that the more recent the date, the more similar the circumstances. However, most of the fifty-year period in question was taken up by a world-encircling conflict which is now (mostly) resolved. It is indeed the period just prior to this fifty year window -- the immediate post-war era from 1945-53 -- that is most closely analogous to our present situation: we have emerged from a world-wide conflict (WWII then, the Cold War now) as the most potent military force in the world (then due to our sole possession of the atom bomb and our intact indutrial base, now because of our general prosperity, and our edge in military technology, strategy, and doctrine). The indisputably successful post-war occupation, reconstruction, and democratic reform of Japan and Germany is therefore an especially apt precedent.
3. How successful do you think the military operations and "regime change" in Afghanistan have been in achieving their stated objectives? Does this example affect your feelings about war in Iraq in any way?
How does this the Afghan experience affect our "feelings" on Iraq? Why, it makes us feel all warm and fuzzy inside. How nice of you to ask. But it might be more pertinent to ask how it affects our thoughts about the war ...
Since the main stated objective in Afghanistan was to deprive al-Qaeda of its base of operations, and the protection provided by Afghanistan's sovreignty, this operation was a roaring success: what elements of al-Qaeda remain in Afghanistan are in hiding or on the run, their bases and training grounds are destroyed; a wealth of intelligence data was captured; and they have only been able to carry out two significant operations since the fall of Afghanistan (the bombings in Kenya and Bali).
That Afghanistan has not been transformed into a Jeffersonian ideal of pluralistic democracy in the year-plus-change since the collapse of the Taliban is not a sign of failure; Athens was not built in a day. There are signs of progress (women going back to school, returning to practice medicine, and appointed to judgeships), and the potential for further improvement where before there was none. And with the now-reliable delivery of food and medical aid, free from pilfering, graft, and obstruction by the Taliban, many more lives have been saved by the war than were lost in it. Compared to the other options available to Afghanistan -- continued rule by the Taliban, or elimination of the Taliban without allied presence afterward -- this is unquestionably the most constructive path to choose, and even if it should eventually fail, we have no reason to regret choosing it.
4. As a basis for war, the Bush Administration accuses Iraq of trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, nuclear), supporting terrorism, and brutalizing their own people. Since Iraq is not the only country engaged in these actions, under what circumstances should the US go to war with other such nations, in addition to going to war with Iraq?
I reject the implicit argument that we should not consider liberating Iraq unless we are willing to do the same with every brutal regime within reach. Should charities withhold food because they don't have enough to feed everyone in need? Should police refrain from fighting crime because they lack the resources to eliminate all crime?
There is one strategic factor not mentioned in the question that gives the Iraq situation special urgency: possessed of nuclear weapons, Saddam would use them in pursuit of the same goals he had before the 1991 war: domination of a significant portion of the world's oil reserves. This would give Saddam an intolerable amount of power over the west, as well as more revenue with which to fund whatever ambitions he might harbor beyond this. (We faced a similar situation with the Noriega regime in Panama, which aspired to control the Panama Canal.) It seems inevitable that he would come into conflict with Israel, a conflict which could easily escalate into a nuclear exchange, with millions of lives lost on both sides.
His attempt to assassinate former President Bush made no sense from a strategic standpoint; it seemed to be motivated by either hatred of the United States, or a desire to enhance his image with anti-American elements in the Muslim world. Either motiviation suggests he would consider a terrorist strike against the US using WMDs, even if it made no strategic sense to do so.
Each of the traits of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime is duplicated elsewhere, but the unique combination of the near-term prospect of the aquisition of nuclear weapons, past belligerence and desire for regional domination, past underestimation of the consequences of belligerence, and a location of profound strategic importance to the west, makes Saddam Hussein's regime uniquely important and dangerous.
5. The Bush Administration has issued numerous allegations about the threat represented by Iraq, many of which have been criticized in some quarters as hearsay, speculation or misstatements. Which of the Administration's allegations do you feel stand up best to those criticisms?
It is hard to deny that Iraq possesses, and is actively concealing, chemical weapons. They have not only possessed, but have actually used, such weapons in the past; they have verifiably purchased the means to make more; they have been unable to substantiate their claim to have destroyed such weapons; they have been found to possess missile warheads designed to deploy chemical weapons; and suspect activities observed by US intelligence (and presented to the UNSC by Colin Powell) around facilites designated for imminent inspection have included a chem-warfare decontamination vehicle.
I find all of the evidence presented by Colin Powell to the UNSC credible, chiefly because the French, Germans, and Russians have not challenged its authenticity or accuracy, nor the US's interpretation of that evidence. If those governments believed that they could plausibly challenge the evidence, they doubtless would do so, as it would strengthen their own position. The fact that they have not done so indicates that, however vague the evidence may seem to a lay audience, even the most skeptical of knowledgeable observers consider the evidence unassailable.
That there is cooperation between the Ba'ath regime and al-Qaeda is plausible; but on the other hand unproven; but on the third hand, probably unproveable even if true. The regime's linkage to other terrorist organizations is a matter of record: its sponsorship of Hamas, its payments to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, and the fact that terrorsts Abu Abbas and Abu Nidal both chose Iraq as a safe haven. It is plausible that the "iceberg theory" applies: that what is visible and known is only a fraction of what actually exists. Finally, Saddam's decision to send his Air Force to Iran before the allied attack in the first Gulf War indicate that he is willing to make alliances with former enemies if threatened by a greater non-Islamic adversary; the same logic could apply to al-Qaeda.
Posted by Kevin Shaum at February 15, 2003 08:00 PM | TrackBack